



Testing Autonomous and Automated Driving Functions

Challenges and Potential Solutions

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Thanks go to

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- Funding agencies and their corresponding projects













Content

- Motivation Why is it important to assure safety in the context of autonomous driving (AD) and ADAS?
- Ontology-based testing Using ontologies and combinatorial testing for identifying critical scenarios
- Search-based testing for AD/ADAS Using genetic algorithms for extracting test cases
- Comparison of methods
- Conclusion

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Safety-critical systems

A safety-critical system is a system whose failure or malfunction may result in one (or more) of the following outcomes:

- death or serious injury to people
- loss or severe damage to equipment/property
- environmental harm


J. C. Knight, "Safety critical systems: challenges and directions," Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Software Engineering. ICSE 2002, Orlando, FL, USA, 2002, pp. 547-550.



Important Aspects for Testing AD/ADAS

- Demonstrate reliability and safety:
 - · Safer than human driving to gain public acceptance
 - Statistics (U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration)
 - 36,096 deaths on road per year (USA,2019)
 - 1.11 fatalities per 100 Mio vehicle miles (USA, 2019)
 - >90% caused by humans' driving behavior
- Ensure safety in any situation:
 - · Master standard situations and corner cases
 - No or just limited human back-up
 - Fail-operational (HW/SW redundancy)
- Manage system complexity:
 - No "pure mechanical system"
 - · Highly intervened SW and HW components
 - Sensor false-positive, sensor noise, etc.





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Challenges for Testing AD/ADAS

- · Complete software testing of complex systems?
 - Close to infinite parameter space
 - "Testing is the process of executing a program with the intention of finding errors"
- How to assure "good-enough" testing?
 - 275 million miles required to demonstrate safe driving
 - · Physically collecting millage is infeasible
 - Unlikely to cover a sufficient amount of critical situations
- → Virtual testing methodology required to:
 - Consider all environmental parameter interactions that influence the AD/ ADAS system
 - Identify and reproduce critical scenarios as basis for ADAS Verification and Validation





"The family of a San Mateo man who was killed when his Tesla crashed into a gore point at the Highway 101 and Highway 85 connector in Mountain View on March 23,2018. Members of the man's family say he complained to Tesla about issues with the vehicle several times prior to the accident that took his life."



"On March 18th 2018, a 49-year-old woman was struck by a self-driving Uber vehicle in Tempe, Arizona. She was transported to the hospital, where she died. In the aftermath, Uber's self-driving program is hanging on by a thread, while the rest of the industry debates the speed in which these vehicles were being rushed to market. It is widely seen as the first person to be killed by an autonomous vehicle."







Tesla accident in Taiwan, 2020.

Crash influencing factors



- 1. There was a bridge before the truck
- 2. The highway lane is curved
- 3. The truck has a white color
- 4. The driver of the Tesla car was not reacting


Summary motivation

- Often there is more than one influencing factor for a crash
 - Multiple decisions, interactions, etc. must occur at the same time
- There is a need for testing such scenarios
 - FOCUS on CRITICAL SCENARIOS considering interactions
- Need testing approaches that provide scenarios interacting with the system under test, i.e., the AD car / ADAS function

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Summary motivation (cont.)

 Need to come up with critical scenarios for safety-critical systems



Scenario: Sequence of

interactions

Interaction: Action from SUT + reaction from environment

WANT TO REVEAL A FAULT!!!!



Scenario-based ADAS/AD V&V

Scenario-based approaches are considered as proper methods


 In safety of the intended Functionality (SOTIF) ISO PAS 21448: Use case/Scenario-based Hazard and Risk evaluation—V&V accordingly: simulation, real world confirmation;



Figure 11: Example of optical illusion drawing that could fool a vision system. Source: SOTIF ISO PAS 21448

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
Scenario-based testing



Make us of combinatorial testing for test case generation

Have to consider a lot of scenarios!

• Static part: streets, traffic signs, houses, marks on street, weather conditions,...





• Dynamic part: pedestrians, other cars, indention of ego vehicle,... → **behavior** over time

USE ONTOLOGIES FOR REPRESENTING KNOWLEDGE

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Critical scenarios identification for ADAS/AD systems


- · What is safety critical scenario?
- How to find and identify critical scenarios?


Finding Critical Scenarios for Automated Driving Systems: A Systematic Mapping Study


Xinhai Zhang, Jianbo Tao, Kaige Tan, Member, IEEE, Martin Törngren, Senior Member, IEEE, José Manuel Gaspar Sánchez, Member, IEEE, Muhammad Rusyadi Ramli, Member, IEEE, Xin Tao, Member, IEEE, Marous Gyllenhammar, Franz Wotawa, Member, IEEE, Naiven Mohan, Member, IEEE, Mihai Nica, Member, IEEE, and Hermann Felbinger, Member, IEEE,

- X. Zhang is with Signa Technology Consulting AB and the autonomous group of Scania CV AB in Swedern. He was with the Mechatronics division of KT1 for most of the time when writing this paper.

 E-mail: xinha@ikkl.se.
 J. Tao, M. Nica and H. Felbinger are with AVI.
 K. Tan, M. Törngren, J. Gaspar, M. R. Ramli, M. Gyllenhammar and N. Mohan are with the Mechatronics division at KT1, Stockholm. Sweden
 X. Tao is with the Mechatronics division at KT1, Stockholm. Sweden
 K. Tao is with the Integrated Transport Research Lab (ITRL) of KTH.
 M. Gyllenhammar is with Zenesca AB, Gothenburg, Sweden
 F. Wolawa is with the CD Laboratory for Quality Assurance Methodology
 for Autonomous Selfety Critical Systems (QAMCAS), Inst. for Software Technology, TU Graz, Graz, Austria









Regarding Ontology...

• An ontology is a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization that is characterized by high semantic expressiveness required for increased complexity

Feilmayr, C., Wöß, W.: An analysis of ontologies and their success factors for application to business. Data & Knowledge Engineering pp. 1{23 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.datak.2015.11.003

- To describe concepts in a formal way
 - A concept describes an entity either from the real world (e.g., a car) or from nonmaterial descriptions (e.g., a sentence or a physical force)
- To describe the knowledge (e.g., relationships) of these concepts
 - Attributes
 - 。 Inheritance
 - Composition





Definition 1: Ontology

• An **ontology** is a tuple $(C, A, D, \omega, R, \tau, \psi)$ where:

C is a finite set of concepts

A is a finite set of attributes

D is a finte set of domain elements


 $\omega: C \mapsto 2^{A \times 2^D}$ is a function mapping concepts to a set of tuples specifying the attribute and its domain elements

R is a finite set of tuples from C×C stating that two concepts are related

 $\tau: R \times R \mapsto \{c,i\}$ assigns a type to each relation using **i** for **inheritance** and **c** for **composition**

 $\psi: R \times R \mapsto IN_0 \times IN_0$ is a function mapping relationships solely for type c to its minimum and maximum arity.

The **arity** is for specifying how many concepts a particular concepts may comprise and ranges from 0 to any arbitrary natural number



Definition 2: Root Concept & Leaf Concept

- Given an ontology is a tuple (C, A, D, ω , R, τ , ψ), a concept c is a **root concept** if and only if there exists no relation (c', c, x) \in R for c' \in C, x \in $\{i, c\}$ e.g., Text
- A concept c is a **leaf concept** if and only if there is no relation $(c, c', x) \in R$ for $c' \in C, x \in \{i, c\}$ e.g., Sentence

Definition 3 (Cyclic ontology). An ontology $(C, A, D, \omega, R, \psi)$ is called a cyclic ontology if and only if (i) there is a relation $(c, c, x) \in R$ for a concept $c \in C$ and $x \in \{i, c\}$, or (ii) there are relations $(c_0, c_1, x_0), \ldots, (c_i, c_0, x_i)$ in R for i > 0, concepts c_0, \ldots, c_i in C and $c_0, \ldots, c_i \in \{i, c\}$. In this case the sequence of relations is called a cycle. If an ontology is not cyclic, it is called acyclic ontology.

Definition 4 (Well-formed ontology). An ontology $(C, A, D, \omega, R, \psi)$ is a well-formed ontology if and only if (i) it comprises exactly one root concept, (ii) it is acyclic, and (iii) where all its leaf concepts have attributes.

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```
All Combinations
                                                     2-Pair (Pairwise)
 Parameters
P1 : A , B , C
P2 : 1 , 2
                    TC1
                                                TC1
                                                               1
P3 : X , Y
                    TC2
                                                TC4
                                                     :
                                                         A
                                                               2
                                                                    Υ
                                                TC6
                    TC3
                                                         В
                                                               1
                                                                    Υ
                    TC4
                                                TC7
                                                     : B
                                                               2
                    TC5
                                                TC9 :
                                                         C
                                                               1
                    TC6
                                                         C
                    TC7
                    TC8
                    TC9
                    TC10 : C
                    TC11 : C
```

 A method that aims to improve the effectiveness of software testing while lowering its cost at the same time. The essence of CT is that not all parameters contribute to failures but by interactions between relatively few parameters.

Kuhn, D.R., Kacker, R.N., Lei, Y.: Combinatorial testing. In: Laplante, P.A. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Software Engineering. Taylor & Francis (2012)

 In combinatorial testing we search for all tests that cover all combinations for any subset of size k of the variables, where k is called the strength of the generated test suite.

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Definition 5: Combinatorial Testing Input Model

- A combinatorial testing input model is a tuple (V, DOM, CONS) where:
 - V is a set of variables
 - DOM is a function mapping variables from V to a set of values
 - CONS is a set of constraints over variables that have to be fulfilled for each test case

Example:

- Assume that there is an application which needs to be run on different platforms consisting of five components (or parameters):
 - OS (Windows XP, Apple OS X, Red Hat Enterprise Linux),
 - browser (Internet Explorer, Firefox),
 - protocol (IPv4, IPv6),
 - CPU (Intel, AMD),
 - database (MySQL, Sybase, Oracle).

There is a total of 72 (i.e.,3×2×2×2×3) possible platforms (or combinations).

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 It only requires 10 tests for conducting a 2-way (i.e., k=2) or pairwise testing to cover all possible pairs of platform components

Test	OS	Browser	Protocol	CPU	DBMS
1	XP	IE	IPv4	Intel	MySQL
2	XP	Firefox	IPv6	AMD	Sybase
3	XP	IE	IPv6	Intel	Oracle
4	OS X	Firefox	IPv4	AMD	${\rm MySQL}$
5	OS X	IE	IPv4	Intel	Sybase
6	OS X	Firefox	IPv4	Intel	Oracle
7	RHEL	IE	IPv6	AMD	${\rm MySQL}$
8	RHEL	Firefox	IPv4	Intel	Sybase
9	RHEL	Firefox	IPv4	AMD	Oracle
10	OS X	Firefox	IPv6	AMD	Oracle

From Ontology to CT input model

Ontology

a formal conceptualization of entities, their interfaces and behaviors, and relationships, describe the knowledge behind Widely used for different application domains. E.g., making, describing traffic situations and navigations in the context of autonomous driving



Provides information about certain entities and their relationships to extract test cases

CT input model

takes a set of variables representing inputs and parameters together with their domains as input model Wildly used test generation technique

Combinatorial Testing

Effective software testing for autonomous driving!

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Ontology Conversion

- Given an ontology (C, A, D, ω , R, τ , ψ), we describe the conversion for the following three cases:
 - o concepts with attributes
 - o inheritance relations
 - o compositional relations
- A combinatorial testing input model M^{CT} comprising its variables, their domains, and constraints denoted by V^{CT}, DOM^{CT}, and CONS^{CT} respectively, i.e., M^{CT} = (V^{CT};DOM^{CT};CONS^{CT}).
- A combinatorial testing algorithm is denoted as CT(M, t) where
 M is a combinatorial testing input model and t the combinatorial
 strength, returning a test suite.

Algorithm 1

Algorithm 1 TC_GEN (O,t)

```
Require: A well-formed ontology O and a combinatorial strength t.

Ensure: A combinatorial test suite for the root concept of the ontology O.

1: Let r be the root concept of ontology O.

2: Call \mathbf{CT}-\mathbf{ONT}(r, O, t) and store the result in (V^{CT}, DOM^{CT}, CONS^{CT}).

3: return CT((V^{CT}, DOM^{CT}, CONS^{CT}), t)
```

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
Algorithm 2

```
Algorithm 2 CT_ONT (c,O,t)
Require: A concept c of a well-formed ontology O, and a combinatorial strength k.
Ensure: A combinatorial input model for n.
1: Let V^{CT} and CONS^{CT} be empty sets.
2: for all attributes a \in \omega(c) do

3: Add c.a to V^{CT}.

4: Let DOM^{CT}(c.a) be dom(c,a).
5: end for
 6: if c is not a leaf concept then
           Let tmp be the empty set.
for all relations (c,c') \in R with type \tau(c,c') = \mathbf{i} do
                 Add CT(\mathbf{CT\_ONT}(c', O, t), t) to tmp
10:
            end for
           if tmp is not empty then Add c to V^{CT}.
11:
                  Let DOM^{CT}(c) be tmp.
           for all relations (c,c') \in R with type \tau(c,c') = \mathsf{c} do Add variables c'-1 to c'-m to V^{CT}.
15:
16:
                  Let d be CT(\mathbf{CT\_ONT}(c', O, t), t) \cup \{\epsilon\}
17:
                 for i = 1 to m do
Let DOM^{CT}(c'.i) be d.
                 end for if \psi(c,c') = (1,x) then
20:
21:
                       Add \bigvee_{i \in \{1,...,m\}} c'_{-i} \neq \epsilon to CONS^{CT}.
22:
23:
                  end if
           end for
25: end if
26: return (V^{CT}, DOM^{CT}, CONS^{CT})
```

Example: Text Ontology



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• 2-way test suite for the instances of concept **Sentence** using ACTS3.1 and IPOG

 $M^{CT}(Sentence):$ $V^{CT}(Sentence) = \{w1, w2, d\}$ $DOM^{CT}(w1) = \{'word1', 'word2', 'word3', \in\}$ $DOM^{CT}(w2) = \{'word1', 'word2', 'word3', \in\}$ $DOM^{CT}(d) = \{'.', '?', \in\}$ $CONS^{CT}(Sentence) = \{w1 \neq \in \lor w2 \neq \in, d \neq \in\}$

_	w1	2119	\overline{d}
		w2	$\frac{a}{}$
1	'word1'	'word1'	'?'
2	'word1'	$\operatorname{'word2'}$	·. '
3	'word1'	$\operatorname{'word3'}$	'?'
4	'word1'	ϵ	·. ·
5	'word2'	$\operatorname{'word}1'$	·. ·
6	'word2'	'word2'	'?'
7	'word2'	'word3'	·. ·
8	'word2'	ϵ	'?'
9	'word3'	$\operatorname{'word}1'$	·. ·
10	'word3'	'word2'	'?'
11	'word3'	'word3'	·. ·
12	'word3'	ϵ	'?'
13	ϵ	$\operatorname{'word}1'$	·.'
14	ϵ	'word2'	'?'
15	ϵ	'word3'	'?'

 When using ACTS 3.1 and IPOG, we obtain 255 test cases for the concept **Text** from this input model with combinatorial strength 2.

```
\begin{split} &M^{CT}(Text):\\ &V^{CT}(Text) = \{s1,s2\}\\ &DOM^{CT}(s1) = \{('word1','word2','?'),('word1','word2','.'),...,(\in,'word3','?'),\in\}\\ &(having\ 15\ items\ from\ the\ test\ suite\ of\ Sentence\ and\ additionally\ \in)\\ &DOM^{CT}(s2) = \{('word1','word2','?'),('word1','word2','.'),...,(\in,'word3','?'),\in\}\\ &(having\ 15\ items\ from\ the\ test\ suite\ of\ Sentence\ and\ additionally\ \in)\\ &CONS^{CT}(Text) = \{s1\neq\in\vee s2\neq\in\} \end{split}
```

 Fewer tests can be obtained if the strength is less than the number of sentences

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Remarks

 There is a better algorithm for generating CT input model from ontologies


Yihao Li, Jianbo Tao, and Franz Wotawa. Ontology-based Test Generation for Automated and Autonomous Driving Functions. Information and Software Technology, Volume 117, January, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2019.106200


Florian Klück, Yihao Li, Mihai Nica, Jianbo Tao, and Franz Wotawa. Using Ontologies for Test Suites Generation for Automated and Autonomous Driving Functions. In Proc. of the IEEE 29th International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE-2018) – Industrial Track, Memphis, USA, October 15-18, 2018


Experimental results obtained


• Testing an AEB function

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












Crash case with pedestrians #199


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
Summary & Conclusions


- Ontologies in combination with combinatorial testing can find critical scenarios in the case of autonomous driving & ADAS
- Ontologies describe the environment comprising a static and a dynamic part
- There are standardized ontologies, e.g., OpenX Ontology project of ASAM


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






Motivation

• Testing, i.e., generating tests revealing bugs, can be seen as search problem



from a start to and end state?

In case of testing: How to find a test suite that (most likely) reveals faults?

Observations:

- Search for input values
- How to justify that a test suite reveals faults? → May use coverage or mutation score!

Different search algorithms

- Graph-based search algorithms
 - A* makes use of heuristics function to find a path through a graph
 - · Heuristics search as generalization
- Backtracking
- Random search
- Simulated annealing
- · Hill climb search
- Genetic programming

Given:


Function $f(\vec{x})$

Wanted:

 \vec{x} such that f reaches the optimal value

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Problems with reaching the optimum



How to use search for test case generation?


- Need:
 - 1. A vector x
 - 2. Function f(.) to be optimized
- Ad 1.: x can be the set of test cases of a program or system
- Ad 2.: f(.) can be a function that returns the quality of x

Make use of coverage and/or mutation score!

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Genetic programming

- Population where each element has a chromosome
- Apply operators like
 - Selection based on a fitness function
 - Crossover
 - Mutation




Genetic Search: Using genetic principles to guide search

Questions:

- What are genes?
- What are the operations?

to generate new populations


Genetic programming



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Genetic programming

- Represent problem as chromosomes comprising genes. A set of chromosomes is called a population
- Chromosomes can be stated as strings (or any other collection)




Genetic algorithm (GA)


- · Crossover:
 - Selection of 2 arbitrary chromosomes
 - Take genes from both to generate a new chromosome
- Mutation:
 - Select 1 arbitrary chromosome
 - Change 1 or more genes for generating a new chromosome
- Selection of chromosomes:
 - Make use of a fitness function

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Fitness function

• Maps chromosomes to a particular fitness value






Using GA in the context of testing safety critical systems

- Generating scenarios for testing, e.g., autonomous driving functions
 - Focus on generating interactions between the environment and the system under test
- Generating test data
 - Methods like CT or MBT generate abstract tests, which need to be concretized.
 - Use GA for finding concrete values that more likely lead to revealing faults

Generating scenarios

Have a look at active cruise control (ACC)




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Another example

- Using GA for testing an automated emergency braking system (AEB)
- · See:

Florian Klück, Martin Zimmermann, Franz Wotawa, and Mihai Nica. **Genetic algorithm-based test parameter optimization for ADAS system testing**. In Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability, and Security (QRS), 2019.





Another example (cont.)

- Use Time-to-Collision (TTC) as fitness function
- Parameters:

Parameter (Ego)	Unit
EgoTarget	[m/s]
EgoSpeedChange	$[m/s^2]$
EgoInitSpeed	[m/s]
EgoOffset	[m]

Parameter (GVT)	Unit
GvtTarget	[m/s]
GvtSpeedChange	$[m/s^2]$
GvtInitSpeed	[m/s]
GvtYPosition	[m]

• Results:

Testing	Number of	min. TCC	min. TTC	min. TTC
Technique	Tests	Test Set 1	Test Set 2	σ
Random	106	0.270000	1.280000	-
Genetic	106	0.347000	0.372000	0.0176
Random	1,065	0.270000	0.310000	-
Genetic	1,060	0.271359	0.271372	$9.19 \cdot 10^{-6}$

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Another example (cont.)




Figure 3. Histogram depicting the resulting TTC distribution of low budget test sets for (a) random testing (one test set) and (b) genetic algorithm tests (one test set).





Figure 4. Histogram depicting the resulting TTC distribution of high budget test sets for (a) random testing (one test set) and (b) genetic algorithm tests (one test set).

- Random testing performs well
 - The probability of finding a fault is high
- GA's focus a lot towards finding optimal test cases
 - Lower number of invalid tests

Does SBT also work for testing different driving functions in varying test environments? [4] SBST Tool Competition 2021 In [4] we participated in in the first Cyber-Physical Systems Testing Tool Competition and contributed a test case generator for automatic road generation for testing a lane-keeping system (ALKS) in BeamNG. Test case generator: GAR that modifies for control point arrangements of a Bezier curves to result in challenging road geometries. The test generator can be applied in two different search variants: Exploitative search (GABExploit) Exploratory search (GABExploit) GABExplore GABExplore GABExplore SBST Tool Competition Outcome: GABExplore only performed well on higher time budgets Total Competition Outcome: GABExplore only performed well on higher time budgets Total Competition Outcome: GABExplore only performed well on higher time budgets




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Can we provide guarantees and determine when to stop testing?

Final considerations

- · Software and system testing can never prove the absence of failure...
 - If SBT generates just one failing test case, we know the system is faulty!
 - If SBT generates no failure -> when to stop SBT?
- Theoretical perspective:
 - No hard guarantees for SBT
 - No guarantee all critical regions covered
 - Genetic operators and cost-function might bias the search
- · Practical perspective:
 - · Advantage: SBT identifies failures fast
 - High number of failing test cases in all our ADAS studies
 - Observation: Cost-function reliably converged towards critical regions between generations
 - · With increasing maturity, the number of failures in the system should also decrease.
 - Given the cost function considers parameters related to failure:
 - No convergence between generations -> SBT has lost its advantage to identify failures fast.
 - Final assessment using other testing strategies (e.g., a high strength combinatorial test suite)



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Further reading

- (1) Hermann Felbinger and Florian Klück and Yihao Li and Mihai Nica and Jianbo Tao and Franz Wotawa and Martin Zimmermann. **Comparing two systematic approaches for testing automated driving functions**. In Proceedings of the 8th IEEE International Conference on Connected Vehicles and Expo (ICCVE), Graz, Austria, 2019.
- (2) Florian Klück, Franz Wotawa, Martin Zimmermann and Mihai Nica. **Performance comparison of two search-based testing strategies for ADAS System Validation**. In Proceedings of the 31st IFIP International


 Conference on Testing Software and Systems (ICTSS), Paris, France, 2019.
- (3) Florian Klück, Martin Zimmermann, Franz Wotawa, and Mihai Nica. **Genetic algorithm-based test parameter optimization for ADAS system testing**. In Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability, and Security (QRS), 2019.

Summary SBT

- Genetic programming and GA have been used for test suite generation successfully (not only for AD/ADAS, e.g., EvoSuite for Java)
- Require a mapping of test generation into the search paradigm,
 e.g. the GA
- Can also be used to test safety-critical functions (e.g., in the case of automated automotive functions)
- Sometimes random testing seems to be sufficient as well!

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Comparing OBT & SBT





[3] Test Case Generation:

· CT-based:

- CT test suite generation using AVL "Load Matrix for Software":
 - CT2: 978 test cases
 - CT3: 21,418 test cases
- · RT-based:
 - · Uniform distribution:
 - · First, select parameters from CT input model at random
 - Second, remove forbidden combinations
 - Repeat until RT test suite same size as CT2 i.e., 978 test cases
- · SBT-based:
 - GA optimization problem:
 - · Genes: scenario players
 - Chromosomes: scenario player properties
 - · Scenario type: random during seed generation
 - Constraints checked on every individual (seed, crossing, mutation)
 - We aim for a SBT test suite size similar to CT2:
 - SBT test run: populate 40 individuals over 5 generations
 - · SBT test suite: combine 6 independent test runs

Node Egyl4eida Paremper Serie, pered (enum): 0,6,10,10,20,25,30,35,40,46 Paremper Direction (enum): 0.30,00,30,100,100,100,20,24 Paremper (Pelediti) per, (enum): 0.00,00,100,100,100,24 Paremper (Pelediti) per, (enum): 0.00,200,00,00,00 Paremper (Pelediti): (enum): 0.00,200,00,00 Paremper (Pales (enum): 0,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10 Paremper (Pales (pelediti): 0,1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10

CT Input Model

			(GA Re	pre	esenta	tio	on		
Individu Player		Gene 1 Vehicle I		ene 2 nicle II		iene 3 hicle III	Р	Gene 4 edestrian I	Gene 5 Pedestriah	Scenario II Type
Indv 0	EO	VI 0	1	/II 0	-	VIII 0		PI 0	PII 0	E-3V-2P
Indv 1	E 1	VI 1	١	/II 1		null	PI 1		null	E-2V-1P
Indv 2	E2	VI 2	١	/II 2	,	VIII 2		null	null	E-3V-0P
Indv n	En	VI n		null		null		null	null	E-1V-0P
Gene	Chrom 0	Chrom	1	Chron	12	Chrom	3	Chrom 4	Chrom 5	Chrom 6
Indv 1	start speed	target spe	ed	offset	s	offset t	t	rate	Player	driver type
E 1	11.11	28		0		0		5	v-model 1	n/a
VI 1	10	2		0		120		6	v-model 2	default driver
VII 1	0	0		4.5		175		0	v-model 1	no driver
VIII 1	null	null		null		null		null	null	null
PI 1	0.56	n/a		13		200		3	p-model	n/a
PII 1	null	n/a		null		null		null	null	null

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How does SBT perform compared to combinatorial testing?

AEB1 Crash Event Distribution

| RT AEB1 | Total | Pass | Fall | FCV | FCPH | SCPH | FCPE | SCPE | TCPE | TCPE

- FCV is the most difficult crash type to detect:
 SBT generated five FCV scenarios in two test runs (SBT05 and SBT10)
 RT detected one FCV scenario in test run (RT03)
 CT2 triggered no FCV crash event

 - CT3 detected two FCV crash events
- All remaining crash events got detected by each method (some less frequent) AEB1 has noticeable defects in avoiding collision with pedestrian 1

AEB1 Crash Event Probability Analysis

	AEB1	P(Fail)	P(FCV)	P(FCP1)	P(SCP1)	P(FCP2)	P(SCP2)
	\overline{SBT}	19.85%	0.05%	13.86%	5.77%	0.09%	0.16%
ľ	\overline{RT}	3.71%	0.01%	1.99%	1.61%	0.08%	0.02%
	CT2_01	3.68%	0.00%	1.23%	1.84%	0.41%	0.20%
	CT3_01	8.64%	0.01%	2.82%	4.66%	0.74%	0.41%

$$\begin{split} P(Fail) &= \frac{Fail}{Total} * 100 [\%] \\ P(FCV) &= \frac{FCV}{Total} * 100 [\%] \end{split}$$

- SBT scenarios show higher probability to detect failure (19.85%) compared to RT, CT2, and CT3, especially for FCV (0.05%), FCP1 (13.86%), and SCP1 (5.77%)
 CT2 and CT3 scenarios show higher probability to detect FCP2 (0.41%) and SCP2 (0.20%) compared to SBT and RT

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How does SBT perform compared to combinatorial testing?

[3] Result Analysis:

AEB2 Crash Event Distribution

Table 1.7: SBT, FIT and CT test generation and crash Summary AEB 2

SBT AEB2 | Total | Pass | Fail | FCV FCPI | SCPI | CP2 | SCP2 |
1 | SBT01 | 976 | 897 | 190 | 96 | 31 | 70 | 10 |
2 | SBT02 | 916 | 237 | 629 | 581 | 37 | 45 | 0 | 0 |
3 | SBT03 | 987 | 309 | 585 | 537 | 51 | 65 | 0 | 17 |
4 | SBT04 | 989 | 730 | 585 | 537 | 51 | 65 | 0 | 17 |
4 | SBT04 | 989 | 730 | 585 | 537 | 51 | 65 | 0 | 17 |
4 | SBT04 | 989 | 730 | 585 | 537 | 51 | 65 | 0 | 17 |
4 | SBT04 | 989 | 730 | 585 | 238 | 248 | 25 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
5 | SBT05 | 989 | 748 | 528 | 218 | 20 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
6 | SBT06 | 989 | 748 | 528 | 218 | 20 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
7 | SBT07 | 927 | 945 | 632 | 84 | 95 | 95 | 90 | 18 |
9 | SBT09 | 900 | 10 | 60 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 1 |
10 | SBT10 | 946 | 837 | 100 | 98 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 1 |
11 | SBT10 | 946 | 837 | 100 | 98 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
10 | SBT10 | 946 | 837 | 100 | 98 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
11 | SBT10 | 946 | 837 | 100 | 98 | 2 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
12 | FT02 | 978 | 953 | 25 | 17 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
13 | FT03 | 979 | 952 | 25 | 17 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
14 | FT03 | 979 | 945 | 33 | 20 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
15 | FT05 | 979 | 945 | 33 | 20 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
16 | FT05 | 978 | 948 | 33 | 20 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
19 | FT09 | 978 | 948 | 33 | 20 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
10 | FT09 | 978 | 947 | 31 | 14 | 13 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
10 | FT09 | 978 | 947 | 31 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
10 | FT09 | 978 | 947 | 33 | 20 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
10 | FT09 | 978 | 947 | 33 | 678 | 759 | FCP2 | SCP2 |
10 | FT09 | 978 | 948 | 33 | 678 | 759 | FCP4 | SCP2 | SCP2 |
10 | FT09 | 978 | 948 | 33 | 678 | 759 | FCP4 | SCP2 | SCP2 |
11 | GT20 | 248 | 759 | 950 | 189 | 1356 | 122 | 96 | 286 | 38 |

- FCP2 is the most difficult crash type to detect, followed by SCP2:

 SBT and RT both fail to generate a FCP2 scenarios

 SBT shows slight advantages over RT in detecting SCP2

 CT2 and CT3 are both able to detect all crash types

 AEB2 seems more vulnerable with noticeable defects that lead FCV and FCP1

AEB2 Crash Event Probability Analysis

AEB2	P(Fail)	P(FCV)	P(FCP1)	P(SCP1)	P(FCP2)	P(SCP2)
\overline{SBT}	42.81%	38.44%	3.75%	3.90%	0.00%	0.49%
\overline{RT}	3.30%	1.62%	0.75%	0.88%	0.00%	0.01%
CT2_01	7.87%	5.83%	0.31%	1.23%	0.10%	0.41%
CT3_01	8.86%	6.33%	0.57%	0.45%	1.34%	0.18%

SBT scenarios always show higher probability to detect failure, except for FCP2 CT3 and CT2 highest and second highest possibility to detect FCP2

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How does SBT perform compared to combinatorial testing?

[3] Result Analysis:

T-way Combinatorial Coverage Analysis

SUT	Method	2-way coverage	3-way coverage	4-way coverage	5-way coverage
AEB1	\overline{SBT}	75,7%	30,2%	8,9%	2%
AEB2	\overline{SBT}	74,5%	29,2%	8,8%	2%
AEB1\AEB2	\overline{RT}	79,9%	34,1%	10,8%	3%
AEB1\AEB2	CT2_01	100%	42%	13%	4%

- SBT has a slightly lower coverage than RT with respect to the t-way coverage
 Each CT2 coverage is higher than the corresponding n-way (n=2,3,4,5) coverage for SBT and RT
- · Conclusion:
 - Q2: SBT identifies system failures faster than CT and RT. However, CT shows more reliable coverage of failure types

 - CT and SBT tend to be complementary to each other.
 On the one hand, CT is more effective than SBT in terms of the detected crash types
 On the other hand, SBT is likely to be more efficient than CT having a higher crash detection probability
 - RT does not appear to have a clear advantage over CT or SBT

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Summary and conclusions

Summary

- Both SBA and OBT/CT work fine for detecting faults of AD/ADAS functionality
 - AEB, ALKS, AD (Apollo)
- OBT/CT comes with guarantees:
 - · Combinatorial strength
 - · Ontology coverage
- There are no guarantees in the case of SBT
- Random Testing is often also working very well

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Research questions

- When do use OBT/CT and when SBT?
 - Come up with guidelines for testing methods for AD/ADAS
- Oracle problem is not always that easy to solve!
 - TTC is not always the best measure
 - There might be other properties to be checked during testing
- OBT/CT comes with a high computational footprint
 - Improve using OBT/CT
- Other application areas for OBT

Testing is not enough!

- Even after rigorous testing we may face trouble
 - Search space for testing is huge!
 - n concepts and k values: kⁿ
 - Example: 100 concepts, each domain of size 5 leads to 10⁷⁰ different tests
- Need to evaluate driving behavior during operation!
- Fail-operationality required too!

Anomaly Detection Through Explanations
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Thank you for your attention!

Questions?



Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs



